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Behavior-Based Network Traffic Synthesis
Yingbo Song, Salvatore J. Stolfo, and Tony Jebara
Abstract—Modern network security research has demonstrated a clear
necessity for open sharing of traffic datasets between organizations a need
that has so far been superseded by the challenges of removing sensitive con-
tent from the data beforehand. Network Data Anonymization is an emerg-
ing field dedicated to solving this problem, with a main focus on removal
of identifiable artifacts that might pierce privacy, such as usernames and
IP addresses. However, recent research has demonstrated that more sub-
tle statistical artifacts, also present, may yield fingerprints that are just
as differentiable as the former. This result highlights certain shortcom-
ings in current anonymization frameworks particularly, ignoring the be-
havioral idiosyncrasies of network protocols, applications, and users. Net-
work traffic synthesis (or simulation) is a closely related complimentary ap-
proach which, while more difficult to accurately execute, has the potential
for far greater flexibility. This paper leverages the statistical-idiosyncrasies
of network behavior to augment anonymization and traffic-synthesis tech-
niques through machine-learning models specifically designed to capture
host-level behavior. We present the design of a system that can automat-
ically learn models for network host behavior across time, then use these
models to replicate the original behavior, to interpolate across gaps in the
original traffic, and demonstrate how to generate new diverse behaviors.
Further, we measure the similarity of the synthesized data to the original,
providing us with a quantifiable estimate of data fidelity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Open access to quality data is the foundation upon which
nearly all modern engineering research disciplines are built
upon. The availability of openly distributed and standardized
datasets is a prerequisite for scientific measurements in im-
provements in techniques, and verification and comparisons of
existing technologies. In the field of networking research, how-
ever, creating publicly releasable datasets is met with many hur-
dles. First and foremost, as an information-exchange medium,
network data contains the personal communications of individ-
uals, and use such data carries privacy concerns. Furthermore,
the scale of typical enterprise networks implies a scale of thou-
sands, if not tens of thousands of users, which has in the past
made artificial simulation difficult to achieve.
This paper presents a method to synthesize network traffic
which can quantifiably mimic real-user behavior. While differ-
ent types of network traffic generators have been revealed in
the past, each serving distinct roles, to the best of our knowl-
edge, ours is the first system which was designed to agnostically
mimic user behavior by automatically learning behavioral pro-
files per user, then using these profiles to synthesize new traffic,
in a way that is quantifiably similar to the original. In this man-
ner, our system learns to mimic the behaviors of a network as a
whole based upon individual members. This work is an exten-
sion of our recent results on behavior profiling and anonymiza-
tion using statistics-preserving anonymity by crowds [1].
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In the networking and security research community, there is
a significant need for publicly available research data. A 2008
survey by Mirkovic showed that out of a total of 144 papers pub-
lished in Special Interest Group on Data Communication (SIG-
COMM) and Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) in 2006
and 2007, 49 of these efforts had utilized network traces in their
evaluations, but only 10 had used publicly available datasets [2].
The cause was cited to be a lack of high quality standardized
and openly available data. It is because of this need that orga-
nizations such as OpenPacket [3], and the more recent U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security-sponsored PREDICT [4], were
recently created – to facilitate the sharing of information be-
tween research organizations. However, sharing network data
has proven to be difficult, at best. A packet capture of all net-
work traffic, for example, would include web traffic showing
which websites users visited, where they transfer files to and
from, the locations of their email, banking, and other private ac-
counts, as well as any credentials not protected by encryption.
In addition to personal information, the disclosure of network
profiles such as vulnerability fingerprints in existing machines,
firewall policies, details of existing security services, location of
database and other sensitive servers, and network infrastructure
in general, can all lead to unintended negative consequences for
the releasing party. Network trace anonymization (NDA) is an
emerging field that is dedicated to solving this problem. NDA
technologies aim to facilitate the exchange of authentic network
data by providing the methods by which releasing parties can
remove any potentially sensitive artifacts from the data before-
hand. Ideally, the anonymized data can then be shared without
fear of breeching privacy. Network traffic synthesis, or simula-
tion, is a closely related complimentary approach which is more
difficult to execute but has the potential for greater flexibility.
In a recent paper, we proposed an anonymization system that
utilized machine learning to learn behavioral profiles for net-
work hosts. Then, by inter-mixing traffic amongst similarly be-
having members, we derive a pseudo statistical-mixed-net that
provided anonymity-by-crowds while preserving the statistical
properties within the data [1]. In this paper, we extend this work
to demonstrate how, given these behavior profiles, synthetic net-
work data can be generated that mimic the properties of the orig-
inal traffic. We show how this type of synthetic data can be used
for many purposes, such as producing realistic network traffic,
reshaping behavior, augmenting anonymization technologies,
as well as simulating communications networks. In addition to
anonymization, this technology has potential use in areas such
as network measurement, and simulation environments such as
the DARPA National Cyber Range (NCR) project [5].
The main novelty of our paper is the design of a system that
can automatically learn models for network host behavior across
time, then use this model replicate that behavior. We show how
to manipulate the models to generate diverse behaviors. Further
we can measure the similarity of the new data to the original,
providing us with a quantifiable estimate of data fidelity.
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A. Paper structure
This paper is structured as follows: § II describes background
work in network-traffic synthesis and gives an overview of the
related works, § III describes the design of our statistical model
in detail, § IV provides the algorithms for how to synthesize
new network traffic using our models as well as relevant per-
formance measurements, our conclusions and future work are
presented in § V and § VI respectively.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Research on network data generation has been an interesting
topic for some time, for a variety of reasons. Most of these
focus on network benchmarking, routing testing, firewall, IDS,
and other security related testing. As recently as 2008, great in-
terest has emerged in the network traffic anonymization (NDA)
field which studies the intersections between the needs of net-
work measurement and security community balanced with the
privacy issues with using data corresponding to human users.
This section briefly covers an overview of these related topics
and describes our entry into the mix in a novel direction: build-
ing systems which automatically models real-user activity and
mimics this in new synthesized data.
The 2008 survey by Mirkovic [2] and other similar stud-
ies [6], make clear the existence of a deficiency for publicly
available large network-traffic datasets. This need has resulted
in the introduction of organizations such as OpenPacket [3],
and the more recent U.S. Department of Homeland Security-
sponsored PREDICT [4] which aim to facilitate the distribu-
tion of network data for research purposes. Unlike data used in
other disciplines, raw network traffic data often include sensi-
tive information that cannot be released without breech of user
privacy. A packet capture of all network traffic, for example,
would include web traffic showing which websites users vis-
ited, where they transferred files to and from, the locations of
their e-mail, banking, and other private accounts, as well as any
credentials not protected by encryption. In addition to personal
information, the disclosure of network profiles such as vulnera-
bility fingerprints in existing machines, firewall policies, details
of existing security services, location of database and other sen-
sitive servers, and network infrastructure in general, can all lead
to unintended negative consequences for the releasing party.
NDA technologies are designed to facilitate the exchange of
authentic network data by providing methods with which pro-
vides can sanitize the data of sensitive information before re-
lease. Ideally, the anonymized data can then be shared without
fear of breeching privacy. In a recently submitted paper, we
proposed an anonymization system that utilized machine learn-
ing to learn unique behavioral profiles for each host on a net-
work, then by inter-mixing the traffic amongst similarly behav-
ing hosts, we obtain a pseudo statistical mixed-net which pro-
vides anonymity by crowds, while preserving the useful statis-
tical properties of the individuals. In a complimentary approach
we study the topic of statistical-behavior-based traffic synthesis
for network data generation in this work. By augmenting modi-
fied data with synthetic models, we aim to further improve NDA
tasks to effectively fuzz the original data and dilute the data of
personally identifiable information.
The most well known examples in artificial traffic generation
come from the network measurement disciplines. Often, net-
work engineers need to test things such as routing paths, load
balancer implementation, firewall policies, and appliances used
to maintain the network. In these disciplines the goal is to be
able to generate a wide range of data at a fast pace. Breakpoint
Systems [7] and Spirent [8] are examples of this role. Traf-
fic generators from these companies can send 40 Gb/s of data
at a router, hitting every port, using every protocol, setting ev-
ery TCP/IP flag, and any enumerations thereof. Phoenix Data-
com’s Packetstorm Network Simulator will emulate an isolated
network for testing purposes [9]. These systems serve distinct
network measurement roles.
The second most commonly observed need for traffic gener-
ation is for security testing. Some of the previously mentioned
systems are capable of generating exploit traffic to test IDS im-
plementations under heavy load. Mostly though, this area is
filled with specialist tools that test specific security problems.
These tools generate traffic as sort of a a by-product to their
main intended use in testing security vulnerabilities, and in that
sense they can be considered malicious traffic generators, to
an extent. Well known tools in this area are NMap port scan-
ner [10], the Nessus web vulnerability scanner [11], the Metas-
ploit exploitation framework [12], and the list goes on for very
long.
In the area of precision network problem diagnosis, special-
ized packet crafting tools include hping [13] and Nemesis [14].
Ostinato is a GUI-based packet assembler that aims to work like
Wireshark [15] in reverse. Network Expect [16] is a powerful
tool that allows one to craft and manipulate complicated TCP/IP
sessions using a high level scripting language. The difference
between these methods and ours is that they serve to serve to
generate specific classes of data for specific roles and do not at-
tempt to mimic existing network traffic behavior and synthesize
data for the purpose of simulation.
A more closely related area emerged in 2008 when a broad
agency announcement was sent out by DARPA describing the
goal to create a national testing platform for cyber-warfare tech-
nologies. From this emerged the National Cyber Range (NCR)
project [5], a multi-million dollar effort to build a system which
simulates a pseudo-Internet with thousands of nodes sending
and receiving realistic looking traffic. Our proposed method fits
well into this category as a technology which can be deployed
on an actual network and used to automatically learn host be-
haviors, then the statistical models are transferred to a sepa-
rate network where the synthesis algorithms mimic the network
hosts that they have learned to emulate for network simulation
purposes.
III. NETWORK TRAFFIC MODELS
Given a packet capture of traffic from an enterprise network,
it’s very likely that from among the content of the data streams
one can glean content signatures that uniquely identify specific
individual hosts. For example, by observing web traffic we no-
tice specific usernames being transmitted from a machine to a
foreign web server. A collection of such signatures can dis-
tinguish one user from another and help form a content-based
fingerprint for that user. A related question would then be, is it
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possible to obtain a signature for a user based solely on statis-
tical information (or “behavior”) represented by the meta-data,
by tracking rates of packet exchanges, frequencies, and port ac-
tivities? In a recent paper describing our IMPACT anonymiza-
tion framework [1] we demonstrated that this is indeed possible.
With significant accuracy we can identify users based entirely
on this meta-data without any content.
In this prior work our algorithms were used to cluster sim-
ilarly behaving hosts in an offline transform that simulates the
effects of a statistics-preserving anonymous VPN with multi-
ple in and multiple out aggregation points. In this paper, we
extend our models to perform data generation for simulation
purposes, rather than prediction. Our focus here is to capture
a detailed representation of user-activity in a way that can best
replicate that behavior in synthetic data. This section describes
the mechanics of our statistical model and the following section
describes the procedures used to generate new data.
Our algorithm operates on data in the form of Netflow-like
statistics. Specifically, we need the following information:
{TIME, SRC, SRCPORT, DST, DSTPORT, #PKTS}
A record for a user’s behavior activity would contain hun-
dreds to thousands of these entries, representing behavior
throughout the day. Given the port numbers we can estimate
which services the user executed. This information is easily ex-
tracted from Cisco Netflow records. If the only data is available
is in the form of packet captures, then the softflowd [17]
tool can be used to replay the packets which can then be recap-
tured in Netflow format using nfcap from the nfdump [18]
tool suite, this effectively converts the packet data into Netflow
format.
Measurable traffic data reflect a complex interaction of dif-
ferent inputs throughout the many layers of the TCP/IP protocol
stack as well as the state of the machine. A user clicks on a URL
on a webpage which causes his browser to dispatch a message
to a foreign server in the form of an HTTP request, this request
is transmitted in a TCP stream, broken into independent IP data-
grams, these datagrams are encapsulated in Ethernet frames and
are passed to the local router for transmission. At each of these
layers, measurements of quantifiable behavior such as volume
and velocity of the packets implicitly take into account the ef-
fects of the network stack and the state of the machine in addi-
tion to the desired concepts of unique intention or behavior on
the part of the user or daemon that is inducing this traffic. At-
tempting to correlate behavior solely for the inter-arrival times
of packets or rates, for example, would incur certain degrees of
information loss due to dissimilarities caused by different im-
plementations of the TCP stack, OS version, etc.
One must also consider the availability of monitoring meth-
ods when designing behavior-based systems. While it is pos-
sible to obtain high-level representations of behavior which are
independent of the implementation environment, such as HTTP
proxy logs which records exactly what the user was attempting
to obtain, such high level logging exists for only a handful of
services and are diverse in format. In practice, the two most
used all-purpose logging methods are packet captures and Net-
flow captures. It is for these reasons that we have chosen this
statistical representation to build our behavior models upon.
(a) User machine port-histogram
(b) Server port-histogram
Fig. 1. Log-scale port histograms. The first half of the x-axis (x < 0) repre-
sents Received-On ports; the second, Sent-To ports. Notice the distinct behav-
ioral patterns.
A. Statistical representations of behavior
Figure (1) shows an example of the emergence of distinguish-
able behavior when examining the data at this layer. This plot
shows the log-scale plot of the port-traffic histogram of two dif-
ference machines on the Columbia network using traffic cap-
tured across the span of one day; we see a user machine mak-
ing requests to various service ports on a foreign machine, and
receiving responses back on its ephemeral port. The server ma-
chine on the right receives several distinct types of incoming
requests and makes three main types of outbound connections:
a low-port connection, most likely SSH, an outbound request
for a port in the range of 600, and replies on ephemeral ports
(in this figure, ephemeral ports are coalesced together on port
1025.
Our model, which will be explained in the following sub-
sections, is time-series analogue of this behavioral snapshot, es-
sentially tracking this behavior of the system across time. Given
sufficient data sampling, our research results show that very dis-
tinct statistical fingerprints of host identity emerge. This re-
flects the natural behavioral idiosyncrasies that lay hidden in
plain sight within network data.
B. Protocol-Transition Markov Model
This section describes our model and extensions, we refer the
reader to our previous paper for more detailed background and
derivation details [1]. The PT-Markov model tracks the dynam-
ics of a system as a transition between specific application ser-
vices represented by distinguishable protocols (FTP → HTTP
→ SMTP, ...). Let st represent the “state” of the system at time-
step t, or rather the current active service, let xt represent the
packet volume information at that time-step. We then have the
following single-step Markov model:




In the above equation, p(x|s) represents the “emissions” model
which describes the output of the system when in that state, in
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Fig. 2. Protocol-transition Markov model diagram.













A mixture model allows us to implicitly capture an estimate
of the different types of traffic exchanges observed under a
particular protocol. For example, a distribution on the sizes
of websites visited, or distribution on the lengths of emails
sent. The above emissions model can be easily estimated
using Expectation Maximization (EM). The update rules for
EM are as follows, for the current parameter estimate θ =
{pi1,µ1,σ1, ...,piM ,µM ,σM}:




















θ contains a parameter pi which tracks the frequency of each
state pii = p(s1 = i), this parameter is not needed in the likeli-
hood evaluations, however it will be used in the synthesis por-
tion. γt(i, k) refers the likelihood of st being being generated
by the k-th sub-model of state i. µˆi and σˆi in the above equation
refers to the updated parameter estimate of θ. Since the value of
the state is known, parameter estimation for the state-transition
probability table T (a,b) = p(st|st−1) consists of simply track-
ing the transition-frequencies as follows:
T (a, b) =
#(si = b, si−1 = a)
#(si = b, si−1 = a) + #(si 6= b, si−1 = a) . (7)
In the above equation #(si = b, si−1 = a) is a function that
counts the number of times state b follows state a in the train-
ing data (how many times a user transitions from FTP to HTTP,
for example). Putting these together we obtain the full proba-
















At this point, all the defining characters of a behavioral profile
is specified and the EM update rules to learn these parameters
from the training data has been specified. One last parameter is
needed: for each model θi we need to track table of source and
destination port pairings. Let bi,j = p(dst = j|src = i). Table b
is estimated in the same manner as T (a,b). This gives us a final
estimate θ = {b,pi1,µ1,σ1, ...,piM ,µM ,σM}.
C. Statistical features and implementation details
One might notice that If we track transition of services based
on port values then we theoretically could have a unmanageable
65,536× 65,536 transition matrix. In practice this is not the
case due to the design of TCP/IP. There are three types of ports
defined in TCP/IP, colloquially referred to as the “well known,”
“registered,” and “ephemeral” ports. Each port type has its own
value range. “Well-known” ports extend from port 0 to port
1024 and are used by very common network services such as
SSH. The “registered” range extends from 1,025 to 49,151 and
is used by third party applications, several Bittorrent clients uses
port 6900, for example. Finally all other services with no regis-
tered ports uses a randomly selected port from the “ephemeral”
range of 49,152 to 65,536. Given this implementation design,
two things become apparent: since the “well-known” range tend
to experience more stable and dense traffic activity it is best to
maintain a one-to-one feature mapping. That is, features relat-
ing to SSH should not be combined with features relating to
FTP, for example. Secondly, since the “ephemeral” range main-
tains no correlation between service and port used, we can col-
lapse all activity in this range into a single bin.
The question then remains what to do with the “registered”
range. Feature extraction for this range is not well defined for
several reasons. First, TCP/IP implementations are not consis-
tent across all platforms and overlapping registration does oc-
cur, in addition different operating systems will allocate ports
differently based on implementation, version, and on the third
party applications themselves. Third, it is not a strict require-
ment for services to use the ports that they are registered to.
Many applications will change ports automatically when nec-
essary, such as when desired ports are already used by other
services. Many applications expose this port switching feature
to users directly. VNC, for example, increments the port for
each active session, starting from port 4900, and allows the
user to modify this range. Most Bittorrent clients allow users
to change the ports used. Additional unpredictability emerges
from uses of NATs, firewalls, tunneling and so on. Treatment of
this port range is, therefore, not as well defined as the other two
ranges. In our work we decided to use a histogram to represent
this range and bin services based on their numerical proximity.
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DATASET NUM HOSTS BASELINE MARKOV MODEL IMPROVEMENT
WEST POINT BORDER 47 2.13% 60% 28.2X
NSA CAPTURE 45 2.22% 37% 16.7X
LBNL ENTERPRISE 35 2.86% 78% 27.3X
COLUMBIA UNIV. 82 1.22% 76% 62.3X
GEORGE MASON UNIV. 65 1.54% 75% 48.8X
UMICH. MERIT 135 0.74% 62% 83.7X
TABLE I
ACCURACY EVALUATIONS ACROSS DIFFERENT DATASETS.
Assuming we have 49,151− 1,025 = 48,126 registered ports,
we use a 100 bin histogram, we would accumulate activity for
all ports between 1025-1124 into the first bin of the histogram,
1125-1224 in the second bin, and so on. This allows us to cap-
ture a rough estimate of behavior.
In our experiments, we used a 20-bin histogram, chosen be-
cause port-activity is typically very sparse unless some sort of
port-scanning activity is occurring. This is because on aver-
age, most hosts typically use only a handful of services (SMTP,
HTTP, etc), mostly in the “well known” range. Sparsity is par-
ticularly pronounced in the “registered” range in practice. Using
large histograms induces stronger training-data requirements on
the machine learning algorithms that train our statistical models,
and makes accurate parameter estimation more ill-posed.
When measuring volume, network traffic can fluctuate dra-
matically for particular hosts even when measuring the same
services. This is due to the exchange of protocol-control and
data messages, which can induce a large variance in the statis-
tical model and reduce modeling accuracy. To compensate, we
use a log-squashing function on the volume feature. Let x rep-
resent the volume of activity that a particular service observes
for a given session, instead of measuring x in our models we
measure log(x).
One last step is to model the distribution of port pairings. The
model described in the following subsection tracks the transi-
tion of destination ports in network activity in a statistical time-
series model to represent services exercised, the type of ser-
vice is implicitly encapsulated in this representation. In order
to faithfully replicate source and destination pairings in subse-
quent data synthesis tasks we need a representation which ex-
plicitly tracks these pairings. Therefore, for each destination
port we track the set of associated source ports. When a state
is encountered in testing that was not seen in training, for ex-
ample the appearance of HTTP traffic where only SMTP was
observed during training, then no entry for that protocol would
exist in the trained model. This can be solved by adding a sin-
gle dummy state to represent all protocols unseen during train-
ing with a fixed value set for both entry- and exit- transition and
emission probabilities. This state essentially represents previ-
ously unseen traffic.
C.1 Accuracy evaluation
We evaluated the accuracy of our model across a range of
datasets. These include the well-known Lawrence Berkley Na-
tional Labs (LBNL) dataset [19], collections from West Point
and National Security Agency (NSA) [20], and University traf-
fic from Columbia University, George Mason University and the
University of Michigan/Meritt Networks. For each host, mul-
tiple 150-entry segments of Netflow were sampled for testing
data, while the rest was used for training. The labels for the test-
ing data is then removed. After training, the model that yielded
highest likelihood for a particular test sample produces the label
for that sample. Ideally, the correct model products the highest
likelihood score, if this is the case the label is considered cor-
rect. Since there are no prior techniques that are directly compa-
rable to ours for this particular niche domain of traffic modeling,
we use random guessing as a baseline to show the statistical sig-
nificance of our results. For example, if there are 100 hosts, a
baseline would yield a 1% chance of a correct random guess.
Table (I) shows the performance of our model. Our model
consistently achieves significantly higher performance than the
baseline. Our model requires sessions on the order of minutes
to hours, and works very well even in cases of very sparse train-
ing data, on the order of 20 minutes to an hour. In this setting,
our models can attribute unlabeled traffic to the the true host
with average accuracies report in the table. This quantifies the
degree to which our models are correctly capturing statistical
representations for the idiosyncrasies of network behavior. The
low-performance on the NSA dataset can be attributed largely to
session-reconstruction errors. Poor reconstruction from packet
to Netflow statistics can lead to inaccurate records on session
duration, size, etc., and this inaccuracy influenced poorer per-
formance on our model.
IV. SYNTHESIS
This section describes our algorithm for synthesizing both
Netflow and packet traffic from our statistical model. We de-
scribe the technical details of our algorithm and provide full
pseudocode for our functions. First, we first describe an algo-
rithm to generate full Netflow-like statistics in § A. In § B we
demonstrate a quantifiable improvement in the fidelity of this
generated data by comparing our results to data generated us-
ing randomly spliced segments of traffic from similar hosts. We
show that behavior interpolation is possible using a switching
model in § C. An algorithm for data interpolation by filling in
missing portions of traffic using a least-squares method is pre-
sented in § D. We show to how to convert these Netflow statis-
tics to PCAP in E. A time-driven synthesis model which can
replicate a user’s activity throughout an entire day is presented
in § F. Finally, in § G, we show implementation costs in terms
of memory requirements and runtimes for our algorithm.
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DATASET GENUINE SYNTHETIC RANDOM SAMPLED
WEST POINT BORDER -4.1445E+10 -6.6203E+10 -8.3211E+10
NSA CAPTURE -5.2935E+10 -6.5322E+10 -6.6581E+10
LBNL ENTERPRISE -3.9719E+10 -6.8987E+10 -8.8169E+10
COLUMBIA UNIV. -3.0717E+10 -3.1106E+10 -5.5863E+10
GEORGE MASON UNIV. -1.3528E+10 -3.5596E+10 -3.7741E+10
UMICH. MERIT -2.0368E+10 -4.1504E+10 -5.2505E+10
TABLE II
LOG-LIKELIHOOD VALUES OF GENUINE, SYNTHETIC, AND RANDOMLY SAMPLED DATA. AVERAGE OF 10 TRIALS REPORTED.
A. Synthesizing Netflow
A few simple mathematical notations needs to be introduced
before describing the system. Let s∼M(p1,p2, . . . ,pk) denote
a random draw from a multinomial distribution specified by the
normalized ratios parameter p = {p1, p2, . . . , pk}. Meaning, if
we had an alphabet of k characters with the respective probabil-
ities of appearance p where
∑
i pi = 1, as the number of draws
grows the normalized proportion of selected values approaches
p. Let x ∼ N (θi) denote sampling a scalar quantity from the
Gaussian mixture denoted by θi = {µi,1, σi,1, . . . , µi,m, σi,m}
for mixture size m. The pseudo code for our synthesis algo-




1  Use the frequency estimate to set the initial state
2 d0 ∼M(pi1,pi, . . . ,pik)
3  Src/Dst port model used to estimate the pairing
4 s0 ∼M(bd0,1, bd0,2, . . .)
5 x0 ∼N (θs0)  Sampling the volume
6  The rest is generated by induction
7 for t← 1 to n− 1 :
8 do dt ∼M(adt−1,1,adt−1,2, . . . ,adt−1,k)
9 st ∼M(bdt,1, bdt,2, . . .)
10 xi ∼N (θst)
11 return [s,d,x]
The synthesis works by using the service (port) transition
probabilities learned during training as parameters in a multino-
mial distribution, which is then used to sample the most likely
subsequent service. This gives us a maximum-likelihood transi-
tion between destination ports in a series. For each destination
element, recall that we have a separate model for the ratio of
source ports in the b parameter. This too, is a ratio-based pa-
rameter and thus can be used to generate a new sample from a
multinomial distribution. Given the strong correlation between
source and destination ports, second order modeling for source
and destination pairings is redundant, that is, we do not need
to explicitly model p(si,di) as opposed to our current p(si|di).
Finally volume information xi is drawn from the Gaussian mix-
ture parameter which is unique to each service model i. Func-
tion SYNTHESIZE-STATS simulates traffic patterns using our
feature representation. This result must then be converted back




3 for t← 1 to n :




BIN-TO-PORTS is function that reverses the feature-
extraction transformation performed on the dataset during train-
ing and remaps the data from features back to their nor-
mal representation. For example, di = 1045 then di gets
remapped to a random ephemeral value between the range of
[49152, ...,65536].
BIN-TO-PORTS(x,h)
1 if x < 1026 : Well known ports
2 then return x
3 elseif x > (1025 +h) :  Ephemeral ports
4 then return RAND(1, . . . ,16384) + 49151
5 z← (49152− 1025)/h  Registered ports
6 return 1025 + (x− 1025)×h+ RAND(1, . . . ,h)
B. Quantifying Similarity
We quantify the fidelity of the synthesized data by evaluat-
ing the log-likelihood of the generated data over the trained
models. A faithful reproduction would yield a higher log-
likelihood score than a poorly recreated sequence. The likeli-
hood score is calculated using Equation (9) in the previous sec-
tion. log(p(s,x|Θ)) is used to avoid underflow errors. We com-
pare the log-likelihood scores of synthetic data with the original
(genuine) data as well as data piece together by randomly select-
ing subsets of other hosts’s original traffic. The latter case, rep-
resented in the table by ”Random” is meant to represent a naive
way of simulating data. We chose to randomly sample real data
vs generating completely random data as this gives us a more
challenging performance baseline to compare against given that
we are using considering real traffic. Table (II) shows this like-
lihood comparison. All results are average of 10 randomized
trials. As expected, our synthesized data consistently exhibit
higher loglikelihood than the randomly sampled data, but lower
than the genuine set, which represents an upper bound. This
means that our method of synthesizing data is more accurate
than if one were to randomly piece together sessions of actual
traffic from other hosts in the same dataset.
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C. Interpolation and Behavior Shaping
Behavior interpolation can be achieved by using a switched-
Markov-model. In this case, multiple behavioral models are
connected using a new external state variable. During the
chain of data synthesis, this variable switches between mul-
tiple models probabilistically under a user-specific distribu-
tion. A simple method is to simple provide a ratio pa-
rameter and sample from a multinomial, as done previously.




2 for t← 1 to bn/cc:
3 do i∼M(p)
4 [st,dt,xt]← SYNTHESIZE-NETFLOW(θi, c)
5 [s,d,x]← APPEND([st,dt,xt])
6 t← t+ 1
7 return [s,d,x]
Data synthesis using switched-models involves generating
blocks of traffic of length c for each model and combining them.
The result is that individual sections of the data will be statisti-
cally similar to different models. In practice, c can be random-
ized at each iteration within the loop if an exact final length is
not required. One might consider why c should not be set as 1.
The reason for this is that the PT-Markov model measures tran-
sitional probability. Therefore, if c= 1, in the worst case where
we have two completely different behavior models, we can have
a thrashing scenario where the context occurs after each gener-
ated entry. This would, in theory, yield a result that is dissimilar
to both of the initial models. This thrashing effect is mitigated
if two models are similar to each other, meaning they share a
certain amount of overlap in ports used, thus allowing the mod-
els to transition between each other more smoothly. In practice,
c can be adjusted based on the model similarities.
To highly another aspect of our model that we have devel-
oped, we choose to use a visual similarity-measurement tech-
nique to quantify the the fidelity of the synthesized data in this
interpolation setting. We confirm similarity by automatically
plotting new points in a 2-D plane where each 2-D point cor-
respond to a synthesized data sample, and their distances in
this plane corresponds to their distances in their original form.
This is known as “embedding” and we have developed tech-
niques for network data embedding in our prior work [1]. We
began with two classes of behavior, one modeled on a web
server (denoted by “web”) and the other modeled on a general-
computation server (denoted by “sos”). A switched model is
used to synthesize samples of their interpolated behavior which
we labeled the“S” class. Visually, we can confirm that the syn-
thesized data indeed falls between these two distinct classes of
behavior. The exact method which we used to map this abstract
behavior manifold is known as kernel principle component anal-
ysis (KPCA). The kernel used in this case is a variation of the
Probability Product kernel [21] derived specifically for the PT-
Markov model. For more details we refer the reader to our other
paper which describes this work in more detail [1].
Fig. 3. Behavior interpolation: Two clusters of behavior profiles are embedded
(”sos” and ”web”) along with a new class of behavior (”S”) that interpolates
between these two models.
D. Behavior Regression
In addition to behavior interpolation and shaping, we can
use these models to perform data regression to fill-in miss-
ing segments of data. Ideally, we would like the synthesized
data to match with the actual data along the boundaries so
that transition probabilities are properly maximized. While
this is not so difficult if we use a simple one-step Markov
model as the basic setting of our model uses, problems would
arise in the future if we were to extend our model and use
a multi-step Markov dependency assumptions where we have
p(st|st−1, st−2, . . . , st−k). In this case aligning the boundaries
becomes more difficult. Given this we propose a more general
solution that can work for any variation on the behavior mod-
els. An efficient randomized algorithm is to simply generate
many solutions and pick the one that yields the highest likeli-
hood given the choice of probability model p(s,x|Θ) . This
takes the form of the following algorithm:
NETFLOW-REGRESSION(θ,s,d,x, c)
1 n← SOME LARGE NUMBER
2 D← [∞,∞, . . . ,∞] of length n
3 [s′,d′,x′]← SYNTHESIZE-NETFLOW(θ,n)
4 for t← 4 to n− c− 4 :













Here a long sequence is synthesized and a sweep is per-
formed to find the indices where the boundaries are most simi-
larly aligned between the original data and the synthetic data, as
measured using a simple Euclidean norm. The values between
the boundaries within the synthetic data are then taken to patch
the missing gap of size c within the original.
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Fig. 4. Filling in missing data: (Left) Shaded entries represents missing data.
(Right) Synthesized entries.
Figure (4) provides an example of this regression method.
Here, we have pre-trained a model for a particular host. We
took a previously unseen segment of traffic from this host and
removed a portion of it, this is represented by the shaded values
on the left side of the figure. On the right side of the figure,
denoted in bold font, we show the sequence of entries generated
using our regression technique. Visually, we can confirm the
similarity between the real and synthesized data.
E. Netflow to PCAP
Finally, given that many network research tasks require
packet capture data, we approach the problem of translating the
Netflow-like statistical data that we have generated into packet
format. This portion of our work is still under development as
synthesizing authentic-looking packet content to replicate the
presence of network jitter and common background noise is
quite challenging. Our current method loops through the list
of entries in the Netflow data and for each session we use the
text2pcap tool to synthesize a packet session. Subsequently,
we replace the source and destination IP addresses (and associ-
ated ethernet headers) which can be recorded in a table, sepa-




3 for t← 1 to n :
4 do DATA← READ-BYTES(/DEV/URANDOM,xt)
5 SESSION← TEXT2PCAP(DATA)
6 SESSION[SRC IP]← st
7 SESSION[DST IP]← dt
8 APPEND(PCAP-FILE,SESSION)
9 return
Typically, publicly released datasets contain only packet
headers and no data content. Generating of content is beyond
the scope of this work, which focuses on the network-centric
behavioral profiles. Currently, we are reading random data from
/dev/urandom for the packet contents. Figure (5) shows an
example of a packet trace being synthesized; a single session is
shown. The current limitation of this method is that the gen-
erated traffic is fairly “clean” and network jitters are not repro-
duced, at the moment. For example, on a normal network is it
very common to see such things as bogon traffic, IP fragmen-
tation, duplicate packets, malformed headers, etc. These eccen-
tricities are difficult to replicate faithfully given that they are
content oriented. Synthesis of these objects remains the subject
of our ongoing research.
F. Time-driven synthesis
With the ability to accurately replicate behavior, we complete
our synthesis methodology by incorporating a timing mecha-
nism to mimic a particular host’s behavior throughout the day.
Given that behavior can be replicated, the only missing feature
is to model the time of day when a host is active as well as
the volume of activity for that time-period. This level of gran-
ularity requires far more training data than the prior algorithms
since we need to observe a host’s behavior throughout the day,
for several days, in order to obtain an accurate measurement to
create a distribution based on active times. If such data is not
available then a randomized algorithm may be used to generate
the data sporadically throughout the day. However, if accurate
real training data is available, then we can model the true distri-
bution.
We do this by generating a histogram of the user’s activity
throughout the day and breaking each day into 288 individual
five-minute time slices from midnight to midnight. For each
time slice, we measure the aggregate volume of data sent to and
received by a particular host. This gives us a statistical sam-
ple y ∈ R1×288 for a particular day. With a set of m samples
Y = {y1,y2, . . . ,ym} we can use a set of Gaussian distribu-
tions to track behavior conditioned on time. For each time-slice













This implicitly assumes independency between the time
slices throughout the day. At the five-minute level, this assump-
tion is not too restrictive. Representing this timing model us-
ing τ = {µ1,µ2, ..µ288,σ1,σ2, ..σ288}, the pseudo-code for the
time-depend packet synthesis is as follows:
SYNTHESIZE-DAY(θ,τ)
1 for i← 1 to 288 :
2 do vt ∼N (τt)











7 Merge all PCAP files into F∗
8 F∗←MERGE-PCAP(F1,F2, . . . ,F288)
9 return
In our experiments our models have yielded interesting re-
sults, such as replicating port-scanners. And while using our
models to cluster existing data, we have discovered clusters of
machines which were part of botnets. The full potential for this
niche area of behavior-based network traffic synthesis is yet un-
explored and is the subject of our on-going work.
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Fig. 5. Translation between statistical representation to PCAP.
G. Memory cost and runtimes
The memory footprint of our models are small when imple-
mented using efficient underlying data structures. The largest
part of the model is the transition-probabilities table. This size
is upper bounded by the size of the list of potential port fea-
tures. In our implementation, we had 1025 well known ports,
20 registered-ports bins, 1 ephemeral-port bin, which yields a
1046× 1046 transition table. If double precision floating point
storage is used for all values then we have a roughly 8Mb max-
imum storage requirement per model. However, the transition-
probabilities table is typically very sparse, because most hosts
exercises only a small subset of potential network protocols, un-
less a host is experiencing some sort of port-scanning activity.
In practice, for a typical host which uses a dozen network ser-
vices, the storage requirement using sparse-matrix implemen-
tation is roughly 12Kb per host. This means that on modern
computing platforms it is easily possible to compute profiles for
networks containing tens of thousands of hosts and keep all pa-
rameters in memory simultaneously.
Fig. 6. SYNTHESIZE-NETFLOW maintain O(n) growth. Large traffic set with
20,000 session entries took less than five seconds to synthesize.
Figure (6) shows the runtime of our synthesis algorithm.
As expected, our algorithm grows linearly in O(n). Even in
SYNTHESIZE-DAY where two loop layers exist, the outer loop
is upper bounded by a constant, therefore the entire system
still grows in O(n). The experiment shown in Fig. (6) shows
runtimes for synthesizing the behavior of a host which had
used 16 network services. The figure shows that synthesiz-
ing a relatively large 20,000 element Netflow record required
less than five seconds. Our computation was performed on a
64-bit 2.66Ghz processor with six cores. We believe our rela-
tively un-optimized research-oriented code can be improved in
production settings and significantly higher performance can be
achieved.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have described a model for representing net-
work behavior at the host level, for purposes of network traffic
simulation. We showed how to extend these models and use
them to synthesize realistic looking traffic that mimic the orig-
inal hosts. We demonstrated how to modify these models to
manipulate the resulting synthetic data, by adjusting the param-
eters, and interpolating between different models to simulate
adjustable new behavior. We further showed how to use our
models to perform data regression, to fill in “missing” gaps of
traffic. Methods to quantify the fidelity of these algorithms are
presented, and backed up by experiments which demonstrate fa-
vorable performance of our algorithm. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we have presented the first system that can deployed to a
foreign network environment, automatically learn the behavior
of hosts on the network, then synthesize new traffic which sim-
ulates this behavior on a separate network.
VI. FUTURE WORKS
While our technology has demonstrated success in mimick-
ing host-level behavior on a per-machine basis, additional re-
search needs to be done in modeling the complex interconnec-
tivity patterns existing in modern network systems. The unique
behavior of a specific subgroup of hosts is particularly interest-
ing, in order to discover trends in communication patterns and
changes over time, modeling networks from the top-down. Our
future works include using learning techniques to model the in-
teractivity patterns of networks. Drawing results from graph
theory, we hope to be able to predict behavior for groups of
hosts, much in the same way that we have done for single hosts.
Our research in applying this technology to network source-
anonymization [1] is also on-going. Ultimately, our goals ex-
tend to synthesizing realistic packet content as well.
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